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COLLECTION PRACTICES
To many, the term "collection agent" may create the idea of an
unscrupulous individual who will stop at nothing to insure collection
of a debt. Regardless of the truthfulness of this belief, in order to deter
tactics such as threatening letters, persistent offensive calls and unso-
licited personal visits, the Louisiana legislature has included in the
Louisiana Consumer Credit Law' section 3562 which prohibits certain
"unauthorized collection practices."' The purpose of this section is to
prevent the more unreasonable and coercive small debt collection
practices.3
The provision prohibits a creditor from contacting any person
not living or present in the debtor's household, other than an extender
of credit' or a credit reporting agency, regarding the debtor's obliga-
tion to pay a debt. This broad prohibition should prevent the occur-
rence of certain collection abuses such as general publication of
debtor lists,6 calculated plans of harassment which include calls to
the debtor's neighbors' and contacts with a debtor's employer to so-
licit assistance in debt collection.8
1. LA. R.S. 9:3510-68 (Supp. 1972).
2. Id. 9:3562 (Supp. 1972).
3. See generally THE NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT, § 7.201-.209 (1970) (providing
remedies for abusive collection tactics which may be compared to section 3562).
4. LA. R.S. 9:3562 (Supp. 1972): "Except as otherwise provided by law or this
section, the creditor, including, but not limited to the creditor in a consumer credit
transaction .... "
5. An extender of credit or creditor "as used in this chapter includes a seller in a
consumer credit sale or transaction made with the use of a seller credit card or other-
wise, a lessor in a consumer lease, or a lender in a consumer loan, a revolving loan
account, or a lender credit card transaction." Id. 9:3516(16) (Supp. 1972).
6. In Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919), the court held that the
creditor was liable as a result of the debtor's mental suffering caused by the creditor's
disparaging remarks made to the debtor's daughter and the publication of a list of
delinquent debts by the creditor.
7. In Boudreaux v. Allstate Finance Corp., 217 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968),
the creditor attempted to enforce collection of a debt due by making repeated unau-
thorized phone calls to the debtor's neighbors, by making a personal visit to the
debtor's home, and by creating a disturbance in his backyard.
8. See Booty v. American Fin. Corp., 224 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969). This
decision involved numerous calls by the creditor to the debtor's employer soliciting
assistance in collection of the debt. The creditor also threatened to have the plaintiff
fired from all jobs until the debt was paid. See also Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1963), noted in 24 LA. L. REv. 953 (1964) (creditor contacted the debtor's
employer on several occasions after notification that the debtor considered that he had
a valid defense); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964
Term-Torts, 25 LA. L. REV. 341 (1965); Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1944) (creditor contacted plaintiff's employer, overstated the debt and made
demands on the plaintiff over the telephone).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Section 3562 does not prohibit contacts with the debtor. How-
ever, it specifically provides a method whereby the debtor may limit
the opportunity of a creditor to contact him after the debt has become
delinquent If the debtor has defaulted and given specific notice in
writing by registered or certified mail that he is not to be further
contacted on the debt, the creditor is limited to one mail notice per
month and a maximum of four personal contacts.'" In this manner,
the section affords a creditor an opportunity to further his objective
of debt collection without unnecessary encroachment on the debtor's
privacy. At this stage of the credit process the debtor is aware of his
delinquency and unlimited communications by the creditor could
only be deemed coercive. Therefore the section limits these contacts
with the anticipation that the creditor will resort to legal processes.
There are exceptions to the broad prohibition in section 3562.
When a person applies for credit the creditor may, without consent
of the prospective debtor, contact others for information concerning
his credit worthiness, character and general reputation to determine
eligibility for credit or insurance." Furthermore, a creditor may con-
tact others to determine the debtor's whereabouts when he has reason
to believe that the debtor has moved or changed employment.'" The
debt collection provisions of the section do not prohibit an extender
of credit from contacting anyone to learn the location of property for
seizure to satisfy a debt reduced to judgment'" or from making an
amicable demand and filing suit. 4 Also, he is not deterred from rea-
sonable contacts with persons related to the debtor if the debtor has
given specific written permission.' 5 Notwithstanding the general non-
waivability provision of the Act," a debtor may waive the benefits of
9. LA. R.S. 9:3562(3) (Supp. 1972).
10. Id. Although "personal contact" is not defined in the Act, this would clearly
seem to include telephone contacts.
11. Id. 9:3562(2)(a) (Supp. 1972).
12. Id. 9:3562(2)(b) (Supp. 1972). See Everett v. Community Credit Co., 224 So.
2d 145, 149 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969) (where agent's acts in visiting a sick woman to
ascertain the whereabouts of her debtor husband were held not to abridge the woman's
right to privacy).
13. LA. R.S. 9:3562(4)(a) (Supp. 1972). See Passman v. Commercial Credit, 220
So. 2d 758 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969) (where liability was denied because the creditor
had merely informed the debtor's employer that he would use garnishment to satisfy
an existing judgment).
14. LA. R.S. 9:3562(4)(b) (Supp. 1972). See Campbell v. Parker, 209 So. 2d 337,
339 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (where the court held that the creditor's actions were not
unlawful since he was merely informing the debtor of his legal rights and that alone
was insufficient to constitute a tort).
15. LA. R.S. 9:3562(4) (c) (Supp. 1972).
16. Id. 9:3513 (Supp. 1972).
[Vol. 34
CONSUMER PROTECTION
this section provided he gives his consent after his debt arises.7
Prior to the Act's adoption, Louisiana jurisprudence had
awarded damages under article 2315 for a creditor's abusive collec-
tion tactics. 8 The courts have used several legal theories to support
these awards but, in general, if the creditor's actions can be charac-
terized as unreasonable or as amounting to wrongful coercion then
recovery would result.'" Although the Commissioner may sue to en-
join future violations of the Act,20 section 3562 lacks any specific civil
remedy which a debtor may use to redress a breach of its prohibitions.
However, section 3562 (5) states that its provisions "shall not limit a
debtor's right to bring an action for damages provided by Article 2315
of the Louisiana Civil Code," and it is arguable that an action for a
violation of section 3562 may therefore be available pursuant to arti-
cle 2315.
Since article 2315 requires proof of damage2 and fault, it is nec-
essary to determine whether a single violation of section 3562 would
be sufficient to constitute fault under article 2315 or whether the
breach would only go to the weight of the evidence against the credi-
tor with liability depending on the gravity of all the creditor's ac-
tions."2 Due to the remedial nature of the legislation and since the
17. Id. 9:3562(1) (Supp. 1971).
18. The damages allowed have ranged from $100 for mental pain and anguish in
Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944), to an award of $5000 for
loss of job, damage to reputation and mental pain and suffering in Pack v. Wise, 155
So. 2d 909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
19. Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919) (mental suffering); Boud-
reaux v. Allstate Fin. Corp., 217 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968) (mental suffering);
Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) (invasion of privacy). See also
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term-Torts, 25 LA. L.
REv. 341 (1965) (where Professor Malone suggests that the theory of inducing breach
of contract should have been the approach followed by the court); Note, 24 LA. L. REv.
953 (1964) (where the theories of invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of mental
suffering and defamation are discussed); Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1944) (libel).
20. LA. R.S. 9:3555 (Supp. 1972).
21. See, e.g., Columbia Fin. Corp. v. Robitcheck, 142 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1962) (where the court held that the debtor produced no evidence that he suffered any
loss of position, pay, reputation or that his credit rating was impaired; thus the debtor
had failed to prove he was damaged).
22. In Cunningham v. Securities Investment Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600, 604
(5th Cir. 1960), a creditor inquired of a patient's physician whether he could speak to
the patient concerning a debt. Subsequently, the patient heard of the conversation
between the two and contended that she suffered a setback in health due to anxiety,
since she had not wanted her physician to learn of her financial position. The court
held that there had been no actionable invasion of privacy. In this decision the person
contacted was the debtor's physician; a contact not authorized by section 3562. This
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statute establishes affirmative standards of conduct, the better view
may be to consider any violation of the section as constituting fault
even though the conduct is not unreasonable or coercive. 3 This ap-
proach is also supported by the fact that one of the purposes of the
section is to urge the creditor to seek judicial relief in lieu of contin-
ued harassment of the debtor. However, this is one of the few sections
in the Act that is waivable,"4 which weighs against the fault per se
concept. 5 It is clear, however, that since section 3562 (5) does not
limit a debtor's right under article 2315 and since prior decisions have
awarded damages for actions that were deemed unreasonable or coer-
cive,2" any similar conduct should still be actionable regardless of
compliance with the section. 7
Section 3562 attempts to prevent use of unauthorized collection
practices by providing a broad prohibition against certain contacts.
The creditor's objectives are considered by allowing specified reason-
able contacts with the debtor and others. Although lacking a civil
remedy, the section does not limit the use of article 2315, and it is
possible that a breach of the statute may be considered "fault," thus
providing a judicial remedy for violation of the section. If so, section
3562 and the prior jurisprudence should be effective in diminishing
unscrupulous practices while affording the creditor an opportunity to
collect a debt owed.
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case would be an example of a contemporary court having to decide the effect of a
breach of section 3562.
23. This view would be analogous to that adopted by Louisiana courts in the
statutory negligence area. See Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d
620 (1972); Dixie Drive-It-Yourself Sys. v. American Bey. Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d
298 (1962). See also Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues
on Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REv. 1 (1973).
24. See text at note 17 supra.
25. Another argument against fault per se can be made on the grounds that where
a creditor has received the notification from a debtor to cease further contacts as
required by section 3562 and instead makes a fifth innocuous contact which is not
unreasonable, it would seem inequitable to hold a creditor to automatic fault.
26. See text at note 19 supra.
27. In Davis v. Lindsay Furniture Co., 138 So. 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931), the
defendant's agent went to the plaintiff's (debtor's) home to collect the balance due on
a bill for merchandise purchased. The agent forcibly removed the merchandise and the
court awarded damages to the plaintiff's wife for her subsequent humiliation and
mental suffering. This decision illustrates a situation where there is not a violation of
the Act since the contact was with a person present in the debtor's household. But since
forcible removal of merchandise is unreasonable, such conduct should nevertheless be
actionable.
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